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ADMIRAL RICHARD G. COLBERT
MEMORIAL PRIZE

"BOSNIA: A QUESTION OF INTERVENTION"

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by

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10 May 1993

Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Review Activity
Building 111
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D.C. 20374-1111
202-433-2230
(DSN) 433-2230

Naval War College
Nonresident Seminar Program
Strategy & Policy

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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93-23793



37P8

93

049

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT UNLIMITED		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) Individual submission N/A			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Capt B.D. Barkey, USMCR Naval War College Nonresident		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Building 111 Washington Navy Yard Washington, D.C. 20374-111			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION Naval War College		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER N/A		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 686 Cushing Road Newport, Rhode Island 02841-1207			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.		
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) BOSNIA: A QUESTION OF INTERVENTION (UNCLASSIFIED)					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Captain Brett D. Barkey, USMCR					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 10 May 1993	
15. PAGE COUNT 37					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION Submitted for the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP					
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This paper analyzed the propriety of military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Using four general categories of rationales; security, influence, moral, and ideological, the author submits nine analytical questions to three strategies for the use of force (1) use of ground forces; (2) use of air strikes; and (3) imposition of the no-fly zone. The strategies were assessed in terms of whether they would meet the military objectives inferred from the four rationales for intervention given the historical and military situation in Bosnia. The author concludes that they would not.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Capt B. D. Barkey, USMCR			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 202-433-2230		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL OJAG-46.11

Introduction

No one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.¹

With Clausewitz's warning in mind, this paper analyzes the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina² and the United States' potential military responses. It will explore the rationales offered for military intervention and deduce the corresponding political goals. From there, it will be possible to assess whether armed intervention will achieve those goals. To simplify the effort, I offer nine questions to be directed at the suggested strategies.

Before addressing those questions, however, it is necessary to sketch the scene.

A Turbulent History

Some of Europe's most tumultuous historical forces have crashed upon the Balkan shores.³ The land bears the marks of Greek, Roman, Gothic, Slavic, and Turkish conquest, to name a few. Foreign domination is at the root of many of this region's uneasy divisions, the first of which date from 284 AD, when Emperor Diocletian divided the Roman Empire into two parts, with the separation running north and south through Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based somewhat on Diocletian's lines, in 1054, the Christian world was divided between Rome and Constantinople, with the line of religious demarkation running through Slovenia and Serbia. In the Fourteenth Century, an Islamic tidal wave smashed into Europe as the Ottoman Turks overwhelmed the Balkan states;

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), M. Howard & P. Paret, eds. & trans., p. 579.

² For brevity's sake, I will occasionally refer to the area simply as Bosnia.

³ These few pages cannot possibly give fair treatment to such a complex history. Perhaps the best one page summary of this region's troubled past is "Black History," The Economist, 22 August 1992. More thorough treatments include Glen E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Service, Library of Congress, 1992) Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-99, Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans. Volume 2: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Contemporary Yugoslavia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), and Vladimir Dedijer, et al, History of Yugoslavia (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1974) Kordija Dveder, trans.

Availability Code	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

the Serbian kingdom was one of the last to fall in 1389.⁴ For the next several centuries, the Hapsburg Empire fought the Turks and established a buffer zone through Hungary and Croatia. Many fleeing Serbs were recruited to man this zone.⁵

This history provides the basis for many contemporary cultural divisions. The northern and western areas of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia, were more readily influenced by Rome and later Austria. Consequently, Croats and Slovenes are predominantly Roman Catholic and use the Roman alphabet. In contrast, the southern and eastern portions, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, felt more strongly the influence of the Greeks, Turks, and Slavs. As a result, the Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet and are Christian Orthodox.⁶

Interestingly, Muslims, who until 1991 were not recognized as a separate nationality, and Muslim communities are more widely dispersed throughout Bosnia than are the more concentrated Croat and Serb populations. After the Turkish conquest, many locals converted to Islam to preserve their lands and to gain influence with the Sultan. Thus, Muslims are today often disparaged as traitors by many Serbs and Croats, notwithstanding the fact that many generations have passed since their conversion.

As the Ottoman empire slowly weakened through the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, nationalist influences correspondingly increased, nowhere more so than in the Balkans. Serbia won its independence from Turkey in 1878, but it quickly fell under the competing influences of two great powers, Austria and Russia. This bitter mixture of elements produced four wars between 1878 and 1918: The Russo-Turkish War, two Balkan Wars, and the First World War. At

⁴ This is an important element in the Serbian national ethos. For example, Serbia's defeat at the hands of the Turks in the climactic Battle of Kosovo is often cited by today's Serbs as an example of their people's courage in the face of overwhelming odds. New York Times, 24 April 1993.

⁵ By this time, a long tradition of partisan fighting had developed as the weak peoples of these areas sought to challenge the cycle of domination by the many empires that have conquered the Balkans.

⁶ The Turks allowed the Orthodox Church to operate with little interference. It became the repository of Serbian nationalism through the period of Turkish rule.

one point in 1908, Austria sent 100,000 troops to Bosnia to quell nationalist unrest, unsuccessfully. In 1914, the Austrians sent to Sarajevo the Hapsburg heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as a symbol of goodwill -- he was shot dead by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian-Serb nationalist.

The First World War dispatched the empires of the 19th Century. Its peace treaties carved out the Kingdom of Serb, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia, or "Southern Slavs," in 1929), from former Austrian and Turkish holdings (as well as from parts of Bulgaria). To govern, King Alexander, a Serb, was installed along with a parliament.⁷

This unsteady experiment ended with the Nazi invasion and occupation in 1941 and the creation of a large Croatia puppet state.⁸ Unleashed by the Germans, Croatian and Bosnian fascists savagely murdered hundreds of thousands of Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and Jews.⁹ In addition, some 230,000 Serbs and Slovenes were ejected from Croatian territory, foreshadowing today's "ethnic cleansing."¹⁰

⁷ King Alexander was assassinated in 1934 in Paris. This period is covered in more detail in Joseph Rothschild, Eastern Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).

⁸ At times, in addition to the Germans, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary all had troops occupying former Yugoslavia. By 1943, some 600,000 German troops were garrisoned throughout the Balkans. German Antiguerilla Operation in the Balkans (1941-1944), Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-243 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954)(1974 reprint), p. 49. It should be noted that their duties included more than anti-guerilla actions. They extended to manning and fortifying the Dalmatian coast against allied invasion, as well as securing the production and transportation of natural resources (such as bauxite) for the Nazi war effort. *Ibid.* at 47-72. Although it appears that as many as seventeen divisions operated in Serbia, these often under strength units were frequently made up of overage reservists who found the going especially difficult in the mountainous terrain.

⁹ Although the Serbs claim 500,000 to 750,000 died at Croatian hands, others put the figure at 350,000. Jozo Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Contemporary Yugoslavia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 272. Obviously, there is little moral difference between the figures.

¹⁰ Vladimir Dedijer, et al, History of Yugoslavia (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1974) Kordija Kveder, trans., p. 580. Hereinafter, History. The Germans finally halted the Croats efforts to rid their country of all Serbs because it led to more unrest in the neighboring, German-occupied Serbia. Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1991), p. 19. Hereinafter, Cviic.

Throughout the war, fractious guerrilla forces offered resistance, with those led by Josip Broz Tito, a part-Croatian/part-Slovenian communist, ultimately establishing control over all of Yugoslavia with British and Soviet assistance. After Tito's split with Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia enjoyed relative prosperity.¹¹ To check the various nationalist energies, however, Tito employed a strong communist party organization and a centralized system of government. This system included a federal army and security apparatus (the Administration of State Security, "UDB-a"). These features, along with the fear of Soviet domination and the west's strategic interest in a unified and non-Soviet Yugoslavia, somewhat dampened nationalistic fervor. Nevertheless, in 1974, ethnic unrest in the republics forced Tito to grant them more autonomy.¹²

Without Tito, who died in 1980, the federal institutions proved unable to withstand the storms created by the fall of communism throughout Eastern Europe in 1990. Having long used nationalism to help maintain their power,¹³ former Communist leaders, such as Serbia's President, Slobodan Milosevic, waived the nationalist flag all the more furiously.

Croatians and Slovenians saw 1991 as the opportune moment to throw off not only communism, but what they saw as the strangling Serbian domination which had crept into Yugoslavia's federal system. Together, they declared independence from the Yugoslavian federation on 25 June 1991. The United Nations recognized these nations along with Bosnia-Herzegovina on 22 May 1992.¹⁴

¹¹ Relative to the rest of Eastern Europe, as well as Spain and Greece.

¹² More detailed treatment of this period is found in Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia Viking Press, 1968).

¹³ Cviic, chapter 2.

¹⁴ Anton Bebler, "Yugoslavia's Agony: Civil War Becomes Savage Chaos," International Defense Review, 9/1992, p. 815. Hereinafter, Bebler.

In Slovenia, the most homogeneous of the former Yugoslav republics,¹⁶ hastily gathered independence forces routed the better equipped but ineptly-led Yugoslav army (YPA).¹⁶

Surprised, the YPA quickly withdrew from this inhospitable, mountainous area (the Italian and Austrian alps mix there) and turned their attentions to the growing unrest in Croatia which threatened their rear.¹⁷

Croatia has been home to large pockets of ethnic Serbians since the days of the Hapsburg buffer zone. Once they declared independence, Croatian fighters confronted their Croatian-born, but ethnically Serb neighbors (formed as paramilitary or territorial defense forces) along with the YPA (now almost entirely Serbian). Great violence erupted with all sides reportedly committing appalling atrocities (an estimated 15,000 killed, including many civilians).¹⁸ In addition, those units exercising control over an area forcefully ejected anyone of dissimilar ethnic background, an old practice now euphemistically called "ethnic cleansing."

Ultimately, the inadequately supplied Croatians were able to fight to a draw with the larger and better equipped, but poorly led, Serbian units, although those forces currently hold a third of pre-war Croatian territory and have proclaimed their own "Serbian Autonomous Province Krajina."¹⁹ Some 14,000 United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) presently monitor an

¹⁶ Slovenia's population of 2 million is 91 percent Slovene, 3 percent Croat, and 2 percent Serb, with Hungarians, Italians, and Germans making up the rest. Leslie Vinjamuri, "Slovenia: Background and Basic Facts," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 92-674F (27 August 1992)(using 1990 data).

¹⁶ Bebler, p. 813-15.

¹⁷ The Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) began large-scale operations in Slovenia on 26-27 April 1991. However, by 18 July 1991, the last YPA soldiers were withdrawn. Bebler, p. 813-15. Slovenia commemorated the withdrawal of the last federal soldier on 26 October 1991. Julie Kim and Erich Saphir, "Yugoslavia: Chronology of Events June 15, 1991-August 15, 1992," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 92-689F (25 August 1992), p. 15. Hereinafter cited as Chronology.

¹⁸ Bebler, p. 816. Also, David N. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspective," Strategic Review, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 34. Hereinafter, Nelson.

¹⁹ Nelson, p. 34. A critique of Serb strategy and tactics can be found in Tammy Arbuckle, "Yugoslavia: Strategy and Tactics of Ethnic Warfare," International Defense Review, 1/1992, p. 20. Hereinafter, Arbuckle.

uneasy ceasefire (the 15th) signed in January 1992.²⁰ Because so many issues remain unsettled, fighting threatens to erupt at any time.²¹ With the conflict in Croatia over, for the moment, both Croatian and Serbian forces shifted their attention to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To meet a deadline that the European Community imposed for recognition, Bosnia held a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia on 29 February 1992. The ethnic Serbians, some 31 percent of the 4.3 million Bosnians, boycotted the referendum, denounced the result (99.4 percent in favor of independence), and proclaimed their own "Serbian Republic of Bosnia."²² Shortly thereafter, outright war began as Bosnian-Serbs in the territorial defense forces, Bosnian-Serb reservists from the former federal army, and paramilitary forces, all assisted by the YPA, gained control of some 70 percent of Bosnian territory. They were resisted by the Croatian Army, Croatian volunteers, Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-Muslims.²³

During the fighting, many communities were besieged, including Sarajevo. Starvation was combined with indiscriminate sniper and artillery attacks, causing great suffering among the non-combatant populations of these communities.²⁴ Additionally, most non-Serbian occupants of captured territory either fled or were violently ejected from these areas.²⁵ An estimated 600,000

²⁰ *Ibid.* In 22 January 1993, Croatian forces attacked one of these areas, with the UNPROFOR in no position to stop them. The ceasefire soon resumed as both Croatia and Serbia returned their attentions to Bosnia. "How Many Little Wars Make a Big One," *The Economist*, 30 January 1993.

²¹ Notably, the UNPROFOR mandate expires at the end of June 1993. *Ibid.*

²² Bosnian-Croats responded by proclaiming a "Croatian Community of Central Bosnia." Milan Vega, "The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Janes Intelligence Review*, February 1993, p. 64. Hereinafter, Vega, JIR 2/93.

²³ Although international pressure ended the overt presence of the Croatian Army, the estimated 45,000 Croat troops count some 15,000 from the Croatian army who were discharged to fight in Bosnia. Milan Vega, "The Croatian Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Janes Intelligence Review*, March 1993, p. 99. Hereinafter, Vega, JIR 3/93.

²⁴ Sarajevo was fed through an international airlift reminiscent of the efforts in Berlin. Patrice K. Curtis, "The Sarajevo Airlift: U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 92-777F (29 October 1992). Unfortunately, there are no other international airports in Bosnia and it has been necessary to airdrop supplies to some besieged areas.

²⁵ Bosnians apparently did likewise to Serbian occupants of Bosnian controlled areas.

have fled to Croatia.²⁶ All told, an estimated two million have been displaced by the fighting, creating the largest refugee crisis since World War II.²⁷ By January 1993, an estimated 17,000 had been killed in the fighting.²⁸

At the moment, great international attention is focused on Bosnia. An international military force of some 9,100 troops is on the ground to assist in the supply of humanitarian needs. Both the European Community and the United Nations are seeking the belligerents' agreement on a plan to divide Bosnia into ten ethnically-based regions joined by a loose federation similar to the Swiss Canton system.²⁹ The Bosnian and Croatian Governments have agreed; the Bosnian-Serbs have not signed on and are thought unlikely to so long as their successes continue on the battlefield.

Having focused on Bosnia, it is appropriate to step back for a moment to consider the global facets of this conflict.

The Geopolitical Dimension

None of the former Yugoslav republics have forces capable of projecting themselves further than their neighboring states, much less to the United States.³⁰ The potential strategic danger to the United States lies in the possibility that the conflict might spread beyond Bosnia. To date,

²⁶ "How Many Little Wars Make a Big One," The Economist (30 January 1993). Also, Lois B. McHugh, "Yugoslavia: Refugee Assistance," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 93-267F (23 February 1993). Hereinafter, Refugee.

²⁷ Bebler, p. 816.

²⁸ Refugee, p. 1. Others claim as many as 100,000 casualties. New York Times, 29 April 1993.

²⁹ See New York Times, 26 March 1993. In continuing efforts to resolve the conflict, the EC/UN negotiators have proposed connecting the Serbian "cantons" with a six mile wide, fifty mile long, corridor. New York Times, 26 April 1993.

³⁰ That is not to diminish the ever-present possibility of isolated terrorist actions. However, research (limited to unclassified material) has revealed no reports indicating that the Balkan states are presently active in this regard. That could change, of course, were the U.S. to get more directly involved.

Serbian incursions have been reported in Italy, Austria, and Hungary.³¹ Pointing to several, as yet, hypothetical scenarios, some have argued that a spreading conflict might eventually lead to involvement of two NATO allies.³² The first scenario involves Kosovo.

Kosovo is a province of Serbia. Once largely autonomous, Serbia proper has increasingly, sometimes violently, impressed itself on Kosovo's overwhelmingly Albanian population by taking over government processes and deploying large numbers of police and troops.³³ Serbia's heavy-handedness and the expressed desire of many Kosovars for union with Albania has compelled the latter country to proclaim that it will militarily intervene if Serbia violently represses the Kosovars.³⁴ If Albania becomes involved, Turkey may assist the Albanians (their fellow Muslims), as might Macedonia with its large Albanian minority.³⁵ Given Serbia's pattern of focusing on the next rebellious region after settlement of the last, those in Kosovo face the real possibility of Serbia's increased attentions should the war in Bosnia end.

A similar possibility exists in Macedonia.³⁶ The inhabitants of this former Yugoslav republic are approximately one-third Albanian.³⁷ However, because both Bulgaria and Greece

³¹ Bebler, p. 816.

³² "The Future of the Balkans: An Interview with David Owen," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 4.

³³ Albanians, who are mostly Muslim, make up 90 percent of the population, or almost two million people. Steven Woehrel, "Kosovo: The Next Post-Yugoslav Crisis?" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 92-818F (16 November 1992). Hereinafter, Kosovo. See also New York Times, 25 April 1993.

³⁴ Albania and Serbia are bitter historical enemies. Kosovo, summary page.

³⁵ If Macedonia sends troops, then Greece and Bulgaria might be drawn in, for the reasons discussed below. Kosovo, p.7. Interview, p. 4. Lord Owen notes that Turkey is an important American ally because she provides the United States a foothold in Asia and played a crucial role in the Gulf War. Ibid. Moreover, Turkey's allegiance may be critical to containing an expansionist and hostile Iran.

³⁶ Julie Kim & Carol Migdalovitz, "Macedonia (Skopje): Recognition and Conflict Prevention," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 93-69F (11 January 1993).

³⁷ The former federal army withdrew from Macedonia on 26 March 1992 and did not resist Macedonian independence. Bebler, p. 816.

claim an ethnic and territorial interest in Macedonia, and some analysts assert that neither will stand aside were Serbia to invade it.³⁸ In addition, the Turks may move to protect the Muslim minority against Greeks and Serbs (both Christian Orthodox).³⁹ A fight between two NATO members would greatly weaken the alliance.⁴⁰

That Russia might intervene is a somewhat more harrowing prospect. A strong romantic connection binds Serbians, the "Southern Slavs," with the Slavic "motherland," Russia.⁴¹ Expectations are reportedly high among Serbs that nationalists in Russia will restrain or unravel UN diplomatic efforts, particularly if President Yeltsin had been defeated in the recent national referendum on his rule.⁴² President Yeltsin has faced blistering criticism from more radical members of the Congress of People's Deputies for his failure to support the Serbs and for joining UN Security Council resolutions detrimental to them. Although she has not yet done so, Russia could easily use her Security Council veto to terminate UN-sponsored military action against Serbia (this concern has delayed the imposition of tighter sanctions). President Yeltsin's victory in the 25 April referendum reduced this concern and since his victory, Yeltsin has reportedly advised the Serbs to expect no quarter from Russia.

Leaving the global issues aside, it is appropriate to discuss briefly the military situation in Bosnia before evaluating potential U.S. strategies there.

³⁸ Nelson, p. 29. Serbs and Greeks, both Orthodox Christian, have strong historical and cultural ties. In return for Serbian pressure on Macedonia regarding the use of that historic name, Greeks are reportedly shipping huge amounts of oil and fuel to Serbia (through Macedonia -- who has no armed force capable of halting the shipments) in violation of the trade embargo. Eastern European Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 8 (13 April 1993). A company of Scandinavian peacekeeping troops has been dispatched to the Macedonian border to enforce the sanctions. Ibid.

³⁹ New York Times, 25 April 1993 (citing a C.I.A. report).

⁴⁰ One could question the degree to which such a conflict might weaken the alliance given the Soviet Union's demise and the on-again, off-again battles between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

⁴¹ Russia's longheld desire for access to the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas also plays a part.

⁴² New York Times, 26 March 1993.

The Military Situation

There are an estimated 170,000 to 200,000 combatants in Bosnia.⁴³ Of these, the some 80-95,000 Serbs are most likely to resist allied military intervention.⁴⁴ These forces consist of the Serbian regular army (allegedly transferred to the "Territorial Defense Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina"), local militia, mercenaries, and "Chetniks."⁴⁵ Belgrade has openly supplied these forces and, despite denials, reportedly plans and controls all military operations in Bosnia.⁴⁶

In addition to having some 900 tanks and 800 heavy artillery pieces, Serbian forces in Bosnia carry a huge quantity of small arms, machine guns, mortars and rockets.⁴⁷ They are occasionally supported by Serbia's air forces which include 48 combat aircraft (including MiG-21's,

⁴³ John M. Collins, "Balkan Battlegrounds: U.S. Military Alternatives," Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, No. 92-679S (2 September 1992), p. 9. Hereinafter, Collins. Bebler, p. 86. Croatian forces are said to amount to 41,000-45,000 men equipped with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rockets, mortars, armored vehicles, tanks and artillery (much of it captured from the former Yugoslav army). They have several missile-carrying ships, helicopters, and three MiG-21's (supplied by defecting federal pilots). Vego, JIR 3/93, p. 101, 103.

Bosnian government forces (mostly Muslim) are estimated at 80,000, although only 44,000 are fully armed. Vego, JIR 2/93, pp. 67. These numbers reportedly include several hundred Mujahadin volunteers from other countries. *Ibid.* at 63-64. They are armed with a variety of small arms, rockets, mortars (60, 82, 120mm), mines, and a few missiles. *Ibid.* at 65-66. Bosnian government forces are hampered by supply problems, although they reportedly control several arms factories. *Ibid.* at 66, Bebler, p. 814.

⁴⁴ Milan Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, October 1992, p. 445. Hereinafter Vego, JIR 10/92. The *New York Times*, citing American intelligence sources, puts the figure at 40,000 to 50,000 men. 29 April 1993 and 7 May 1993.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* "Chetniks" are Serbs from the southern rural area of Serbia. Arbuckle, p. 19. Their name harkens back to the monarchist guerilla forces that fought against Tito's communists and, less enthusiastically, the Germans in World War II. *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Vego, JIR 10/92, p. 468.

⁴⁷ Serbia claims to have withdrawn from Bosnia, but allowed members of its army born in Bosnia to remain there if they wished. Steven J. Woehrel, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Background to the Conflict," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, No. 93-106F (21 January 1993), p. 6, Vego, JIR 10/92, p. 445.

MiG-23's and MiG-29's) and 20 helicopters.⁴⁸ Air defense weapons reported in the area include 20, 30, and 40mm antiaircraft artillery, large numbers of hand-carried surface to air missiles, SA-7's and SA-14's, as well as SA-2's, SA-6's, and SA-9's. For naval forces, Serbia and Montenegro possess several missile carrying frigates and patrol boats, patrol and midget submarines (five each), and many minelaying vessels.⁴⁹

The former Yugoslavia's defense forces were primarily trained to conduct guerrilla warfare against an occupying force. Yugoslavia's focus on fighting as insurgents derived from the fact that her primary national security concern was being overrun by either NATO or Soviet forces in an East-West confrontation.⁵⁰ Undoubtedly, these are the tactics that would be employed against any force seeking to intervene in the former Yugoslav republics. In fact, the fighting to date has reflected the use of non-conventional warfare tactics, including hit and run raids, ambushes, sabotage, hostage-taking, and terrorism.⁵¹

More specifically, typical Serbian operations have two tactical stages.⁵² First, using conventional armor and infantry assaults, Serb forces take "cardinal points" in those areas they wish to control. "Cardinal points" usually consist of tactically important positions along the road network. From there, irregular forces begin the second stage by setting up forest camps and fanning out to attack (usually at night) those Croat and Muslim communities isolated among Serbian communities. Then they attack outlying villages in non-Serbian areas. Against determined resistance, irregular forces wait until they have at least a two to one advantage and

⁴⁸ Vego, JIR 10/92, p. 447. Dr. Vego notes that the Serbs are having trouble maintaining their equipment and that these figures do not reflect their true combat effectiveness. *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Milan Vego, "The Croatian Navy," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1993, pp 11-16. Hereinafter, Vego, JIR 1/93.

⁵⁰ *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1990-1991 Edition* (Alexandria, Virginia: International Media Corporation, 1990), p. 1127-28.

⁵¹ Collins, p. 14.

⁵² This discussion is drawn from the analysis of Serb tactics in Croatia found in Arbuckle, p. 19. I have assumed that they are using the same methods in Bosnia.

the support of Serbian artillery and tanks before attacking. They then move to the next area and repeat the cycle.

Despite their preponderance of fire power, the Serbian forces have suffered from poor coordination and leadership. They have not fared well against determined and well-organized resistance. Efforts to defeat opponents militarily have been sacrificed in favor of "ethnically cleansing" newly captured areas.⁵³ Violence against civilians has been an important feature of Serbian tactics. Civilians have been specifically targeted in an attempt to drive them from their homes.⁵⁴

Terrain and Military Operations

The impact of terrain on military operations in Bosnia cannot be overstated. Bosnia's 19,735 square miles (approximately one-half the size of Virginia) are almost entirely mountainous and forested.⁵⁵ There are few roads and rail lines. Most roads are winding, single lane, and have numerous bridges, tunnels, and switchbacks.⁵⁶ Largely rural, the greatest population and industrial concentration is in Sarajevo, which is home to Bosnia's only operational international airport.

Prewar Bosnia was landlocked but for one corridor to the small Adriatic port of Ploce (currently under Croatian control). There are nine other major ports on the Dalmatian coast which are in Slovenian, Croatian or Montenegrin territory.⁵⁷ The use of none of these ports can be assured since Slovenia, Croatia, and Montenegro might be opposed to foreign military intervention. Moreover, the use of these facilities might be challenged by mines, the ten federal submarines, or

⁵³ Arbuckle, p. 19.

⁵⁴ Vego, JIR 10/92, p. 446.

⁵⁵ The rugged forested terrain includes many caves and caverns making it extremely easy to conceal forces and weapons.

⁵⁶ Collins, p. 9.

⁵⁷ Colin Pielow, ed., Guide to Port Entry, (Surrey: Shipping Guides Limited, 1992). Lloyd's Ports of the World 1985 (London: Lloyds of London, 1985), pp. 541-46.

the many missile carrying federal boats of various sizes (using any one of the 1100 offshore islands as havens).

Even with secure port facilities of sufficient size, getting troops and supplies inland may be difficult given the large chain of mountains, the Dinaric Alps, running from northwest to southeast along the coastline. These rugged mountains separate the coast from the interior except for a few roads replete with bridges, tunnels, bottlenecks, and switchbacks which all present ripe targets for guerrillas. Sabotage would require long detours on secondary roads which are little more than dirt tracks in some places. Building new roads would require a substantial engineering effort including numerous cuts, fills, bridges, and tunnels. Security against interdiction would demand constant effort. An airlift may be necessary to assure sufficient supplies get inland (even though it is the most expensive way to supply forces).⁵⁸

Bosnia, however, has limited air facilities. The only international airport in the Bosnian government's control is Sarajevo (which is ringed with hilly country).⁵⁹ When not closed by hostile fire, the UN is using this airport for humanitarian relief flights. There are several other airports in former Yugoslavia,⁶⁰ but roadways connecting them to Bosnia's interior are limited.

The weather in Bosnia is moderate. However, the mountains often bring low clouds, fog, and precipitation, which can limit air operations.

⁵⁸ Collins, p. 20.

⁵⁹ Bosnia has two international airports, Sarajevo and Mostar (which is under Croatian control). International Flight Information Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1992), p. 2-184-3. There are four military airfields: Sarajevo; Mostar; Bihac; and Tuzla. Nikolas Krivinyi, Warplanes of the World (Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), p. 153. There are an uncertain number of smaller airfields in Bosnia. Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1990-1991 Edition (Alexandria, Virginia: International Media Corporation, 1990), p. 1127.

⁶⁰ Former Yugoslavia had 184 airfields, but only 23 had runways longer than 2,438 meters. Only 16 to 20 are recognized internationally. Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1990-1991 Edition (Alexandria, Virginia: International Media Corporation, 1990), p. 1127. Compare The Europa World Year Book 1991 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1991), Vol. II, p. 3090, and Yugoslavia: Country Profile 1991-92 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991), p. 28.

Intelligence about Bosnia and hostile forces is limited.⁶¹ According to reports, human intelligence sources are few. Furthermore, U.S. forces include very few speakers of Serbo-Croatian, much less anyone that can speak the local dialects. Because of the broken terrain, even high technology sensors may be inadequate to identify targets effectively, much less distinguish between friends or foes.⁶²

To summarize the military situation, Bosnia offers extremely favorable terrain for guerrilla operations because of the ease with which they can conceal their forces and interdict overland supply lines.⁶³ Those resisting would rarely present concentrated targets, would have no clear centers of gravity on which to focus, and would have a significant "home court advantage." The Soviet's experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the difficulty that a technologically superior force, even with air support, can have in defeating a determined foe in mountainous terrain.

Having set the stage, I will turn to a discussion of the rationales being offered for military intervention.

Why Intervene?

The bases for military intervention comprise four general categories: (1) security, (2) Realpolitik, (3) ideological, and (4) moral. The discussion will reveal that each category of goals necessarily implies certain political and military objectives. One can then estimate whether various strategies for the use of force in Bosnia will achieve these objectives and satisfy the underlying rationales.

⁶¹ Collins, p. 11.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Recall that guerilla operations against an occupying force was the main mission of Yugoslav defense forces. Page 10, infra.

Intervention for Security

The first and most obvious basis for military intervention would be to neutralize a threat to the national security of the United States.⁶⁴ Advocates of military intervention in Bosnia must concede that the conflict presents no direct danger to the United States. None of the military forces in the Balkans can threaten more than their contiguous neighbors. Any indirect threat, such as the involvement of NATO members weakening the alliance or adding to the destabilization of Russia, is disturbing but, as yet, hypothetical.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ This statement could be broadened to include threats to "vital national interests," which might be defined as those threats which while they may not affect America's physical security, might adversely and significantly affect our way of life. For example, having all Middle Eastern oil fields fall into the hands of one intent on using them to blackmail western powers could significantly change our way of life. The stability of Europe may be a vital national interest to the United States. Although to discuss fully whether this conflict would truly destabilize Europe would require a separate study, I would simply submit that the significant economic and military powers in Europe -- England, France, and Germany -- will likely remain unaffected, even if the war spread to Greece and Turkey.

⁶⁵ Many have drawn an analogy between the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1938 and the present situation in Bosnia. This analogy is misleading. First, although hoodlums, the Serbian leadership is not reported to have designs to dominate the world similar to those Hitler expressed in Mein Kampf. Second, Serbia does not have the cultural, economic, or demographic base from which to build a military force anything like Nazi Germany's which could threaten the United States or Europe. Third, Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia fundamentally altered the security of the rest of Europe by taking over a nation strategically placed, complete with its large, well-trained army (some 750,000 men, including reserves, amply supplied with modern weapons), its natural resources, and its substantial industrial base (including the Skoda arms works). There is nothing like this in Bosnia. Fourth, the Munich accord was especially shameful because, at England's lead, Czechoslovakia (who was not allowed to participate in the conference which decided her future) was forced to surrender its sovereign territory and to subject many of its citizens to systematic extermination by the hundreds of thousands. This allowed Hitler, without firing a shot, to circumvent the last natural barriers to German expansion and shred the collective security treaties between France, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union (which propelled the Stalin toward a nonaggression pact with Hitler). Nothing of that dimension is happening in Bosnia.

For a more thorough discussion of appeasement see Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (New York: Longman, 1986), and Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-39 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Intervention to Influence Events: Realpolitik

Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was the most easily identifiable practitioner of the use of military force to shape political events.⁶⁶ To follow his example, the United States might use its forces to intervene in Bosnia to shape events there and to preserve American influence in the region. Here, I assume that there are no direct security concerns which would compel intervention for security. Rather, this category concerns itself with maintaining leverage for other purposes (such as strengthening long term economic or political relationships).

Ideological Intervention

The not-too-distant past saw the frequent use of U.S. military assets (overt and covert) to intervene in the civil wars of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. The rationale for this intervention was primarily to support those fighting communism.⁶⁷ Since communism was the enemy and defending democracy the goal, these conflicts present examples of military intervention for ideological reasons.

The United States unabashedly supports the spread of democracy as a pillar of her foreign policy. Likewise, the U.S. promotes free markets. It hardly needs saying that internecine warfare is unfriendly to either concept.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ For a treatment of this proposition see Gordon E. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York: Oxford University Press) Parts V-VII, Edward Crankshaw, Bismarck (New York: Penguin Books, 1981). Of course, it was Clausewitz who wrote, "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." On War, p. 69.

⁶⁷ To support intervention, international lawyers pointed to evidence of the outside involvement of other hostile powers, such as Soviet Union or its satellites. The U.S., it was said, would be simply leveling the playing field. Incidentally, it could also be said that the U.S. was acting simply to halt the expansion of a hostile Soviet Union, as opposed to fighting the spread of communism as an ideology.

⁶⁸ Ironically, all the former Yugoslav republics boast some democratic processes. Unfortunately, that fact has not prevented the horrible human rights abuses reported in the area.

It must also be stated that for democracy to take hold in the former Yugoslavia, some fundamental political issues must be resolved.⁶⁹ First, minority rights must be assured. Second, a mechanism of government must be established which allows for representation of the various ethnic groups, but still permits efficient political decisionmaking. Third, some means must be found to resolve the deep historical animosities between the ethnic groups which have been exacerbated by the present conflict. Fourth, a peaceful mechanism must be developed to define the new borders between these republics.

Certainly, peace must come before a nation can begin to build political and economic institutions from scratch and military intervention may be able to force a peace. But as will be discussed more fully below, forcing a peace may be just postponing this historical conflict's ultimate resolution. This is especially true since factions can simply wait out the occupation, as the Balkan peoples have done often in their history, and resume the fighting as soon as intervening forces leave.

Moral Intervention

Moral intervention can be defined as that involvement in another state's affairs because of actions which "shock the conscience of mankind" or violate "community standards."⁷⁰ Two broad objectives to moral intervention can be identified: the pursuit of (a) peace, or (b) justice. Peace

⁶⁹ Obviously, just identifying the sources of the Bosnian conflict would warrant a separate study. See, for example, Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), Robert K. King, Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973). Without attempting to be complete, I offer the four political issues noted in the text as some of the most apparent sources of this conflict.

⁷⁰ These standards are represented by international law, as in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and are articulated in such documents as the United Nations Charter. There is a rich debate on the propriety of using such rationales for the use of military force which space limits prevents me from discussing. See Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chapter 6; John Norton Moore, ed., Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977) and; Richard A. Falk, ed., The Law of Intervention in Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

can be defined as the absence of violence. To avoid the death and destruction that violence and aggression wreak, particularly on the weak or unprotected, some argue that it becomes morally imperative for all those who can to take steps to maintain the peace.⁷¹ As the world's only remaining superpower, the United States becomes the main enforcer of global peace.⁷²

Similarly, the pursuit of "justice" is a rationale for military intervention. Justice can mean many things but in relation to Bosnia it has often been expressed as "punishing aggression" or "punishing war criminals."⁷³

Punishment can have several purposes including retribution, specific deterrence, and general deterrence.⁷⁴ Retribution can be most simply described by the Biblical phrase, "eye for an eye." To "specifically deter" is to punish a particular offender so as to discourage him from

⁷¹ In its purest form, this argument would seem to justify intervention anywhere and everywhere. "If history has taught us anything it is that aggression anywhere is a threat to peace everywhere in the world." Harry Truman, address of 11 April 1951, cited in David C. Hendrickson, "The Ethics of Collective Security," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 7 (1993), p. 3. "Every act of aggression unpunished. . . strengthens forces of chaos and lawlessness that ultimately threaten us all." George Bush, comments of 6 September 1990, cited Hendrickson, *supra*. Interestingly, Professor Hendrickson notes that global containment of communism has given way to a desire to contain violence on a global scale.

Unfortunately, such a doctrine presents the same weaknesses as did the global containment of communism. One, it demands the development and maintenance of huge forces to deal with the many conflicts around the globe (in a time of enormous fiscal constraint). Second, such a doctrine seemingly allows for no assessment of the strategic import of a particular breach of the peace and therefore permits no means for the rational allocation of resources should there be several crises. Third, military intervention to stop a conflagration does nothing by itself to resolve the underlying causes of the violence, it simply puts out the fire.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ On 26 and 27 August 1992, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger named several Serbs and Croats as war criminals, including Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovic (known as "Arkan"), both leaders of major political parties in Serbia. Secretary Eagleburger called upon Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb Army Commander, General Ratko Mladic, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to demonstrate more clearly their efforts to make their forces comply with international law. *Yugoslav Republics: Country Report*, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992), No. 4, p. 11. The United Nations Security Council directed a study of the feasibility of convening an international tribunal to try these individuals. Their preliminary conclusions were reported to be that it may not be possible to bring to justice those most responsible for the atrocities. *New York Times*, 25 April 1993.

⁷⁴ These concepts will be very familiar to students of criminal law.

offending again. "General deterrence" seeks to make an example of an offender so as to dissuade others with similar intentions.

Translating these three concepts into military objectives, retribution would probably require not just the defeat of an offending nation's armed forces and recovery of any territory or wealth lost in the conflict, but some additional punitive measures as well. Specific deterrence not only requires reversing any gain and but also demands that such an offending nation suffers such a loss in personnel and equipment that it will not repeat its crime. General deterrence would require much the same as specific deterrence, except that the offending nation's punishment must be so obvious that other potentially errant nations would be assured that they would likewise lose all gains from their aggression.⁷⁵

It can be seen, then, that if "punishment" becomes a policy goal, Serbian gains must first be delineated and then be reversed. In those areas where Serbians gained their dominance by force, the task is easily done. However, in those areas of Bosnia where Serbians were the dominant population group prior to the war (some 43 percent of pre-war Bosnia's territory), the task is more challenging.⁷⁶ However delineated, to reverse Serbian gains would seem certain to require the use of force.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Interestingly, the deterrence argument has become a feature of the global containment of peace. It has been said that Serbia's gains must be reversed to deter future Serbias from breaching the peace and acting aggressively against their neighbors. For examples of the debate see "To the Rescue" and "The War that Won't Go Away," *The Economist* (24 April 1993), as well as the opinion pages of the *New York Times*, 29 April 1993.

⁷⁶ The reversal of ethnic cleansing would require the return of the victims to their property. This will neither be easy or neat. Certainly, peace would have to be restored first and minority rights assured before most of those ejected will come back to their homes. Even then some sort of tribunal would be required (which had the confidence of the litigants) for resolving the disposition of contested property. One can easily imagine the difficulties of finding titles, records, or witnesses in the aftermath of this conflict.

⁷⁷ Because force would seem to be required to obtain justice for its retributive or deterrent values, the success of this policy goal is inextricably linked to success on the battlefield. As parents might say, "You have to make them sorry." Weak or ineffective use of force will neither deter the Serbs nor anyone else who might wish to test international resolve. Nor will it save those in the area who intend to extract their pound of flesh for the crimes perpetrated against them.

Another dimension of the international concern over the situation in Bosnia centers on the alleged war crimes that have been committed.⁷⁸ To obtain justice, the use of military intervention to capture and try war criminals would probably be required. But this topic is also fraught with issues. By international law, all nations have both the right and obligation to try war criminals.⁷⁹ However, it must be noted that the only international war crimes tribunals that meted out significant sentences were convened after the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.⁸⁰ Because it is unlikely that Serbia would willingly surrender its head of state or the head of one of its major political parties for a trial, complete military victory over that nation may be the only way to secure the trial of war criminals.⁸¹ Apart from Israel, few nations have been willing to use force unilaterally to capture war criminals in other countries, largely because it invites similar actions within their own borders.⁸² Consequently, using military intervention to capture and try war criminals would seem to imply a military objective of either complete surrender of the offender's nation or the use of kidnapping. Unfortunately, neither seems an attractive alternative.

⁷⁸ This is an expressed concern of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General. See, for example, New York Times, 26 April 1993.

⁷⁹ With respect to "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, all signatories are obligated to search out, bring to trial, and punish those responsible. Articles 49(2), 50(2), 129(2), 146(2) of Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, respectively. See also Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Army Field Manual, FM27-10 (July 1954), p. 182. Military courts of the U.S. have jurisdiction to try war criminals. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 18, 10 U.S. Code § 818. Finally, see also Willard B. Cowles, "Universality of Jurisdiction of War Crimes," California Law Review, Volume XXXIII, No. 2 (June 1945).

⁸⁰ I am obviously referring to the war crimes trials that took place in Europe and the Pacific after World War II, the most famous being the Nuremburg trials. See also Norman E. Greenwood, ed. War Crimes, War Criminals, and War Crimes Trials: An Annotated Bibliography and Source Book (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).

⁸¹ Apparently, the UN commission charged with investigating war crimes in Bosnia concluded that total victory over Serbia would be required to resolve war crimes issues. New York Times, 26 April 1993.

⁸² In addition, witness the strain in relations between the United States and Mexico over the involvement of federal agents in the kidnapping of the Mexican national alleged to have participated in the killing of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agent in Mexico.

The Nine Questions

The discussion just concluded can be distilled into the following questions which should be put to any proposed strategy for the use of American forces:

- NATIONAL SECURITY: (1) Does the option resolve or reduce a direct threat to the security of the United States?
- INFLUENCE: (2) Does the option allow the United States to influence the actions of other states or the course of events in general?
- IDEOLOGICAL: (3) Does the option promote the development of democracy or economic prosperity?
- MORAL: (4) Does the option reduce violence or suffering?
- (5) Does it deter the offending nation from further aggressive acts?
- (6) Does the option deter other nations from aggressive acts in the future?
- (7) Does the option reverse the unjust gains of an aggressor nation?
- (8) Does the option inflict some punishment on the aggressor nation?
- (9) Does the option aid in resolving crimes against international law?

I will apply these questions to three proposed strategies for the use of U.S. forces in Bosnia: (1) deployment of ground forces, (2) use of airpower to strike targets in Bosnia or Serbia, and (3) use of air power to impose a "no-fly zone."⁸³

⁸³ Space limitations prevent the application of these questions other strategies including (a) the use of U.S. forces to support the arms and trade embargo, (b) the supplying and training of Muslim forces, or (c) simply doing nothing (by choice or by inaction). Like those strategies considered, *infra*, none of these options offer complete satisfaction of goals. Supplying arms, however, at least allows Muslims to participate more forcefully in resolving issues very immediate to them, to the limits of their own courage and will to fight. The Europeans object to this course because they foresee nations like Iran and Afghanistan increasing their influence in the Balkans by supplying arms. New York Times, 4-7 May 1993.

Ground Combat Operations

The most drastic step the United States could take would be to intervene in the conflict by putting military forces on the ground with the intention of occupying all or part of Bosnia.⁸⁴ In the simplest terms, such an operation would probably have three stages: (1) establishing security (through occupation and pacification of the assigned regions); (2) establishing civil affairs operations to maintain order; and (3) disengaging.⁸⁵

National Security: Military conquest and occupation of all or part of Bosnia does not directly improve the security of the United States. If anything, national security may be adversely affected in that military assets dedicated to this mission are not immediately available to address other contingencies which may have a more direct impact on national security. Moreover, unsuccessful commitments can erode national confidence in the military (which can be measured in terms of Congressional allocations), thereby reducing readiness. The aftermath of the American failure in Vietnam illuminates this point. Furthermore, once deployed, ensuring success may involve an ever escalating commitment of troops - which American history has shown to be the most slippery of slopes.

Influence: Incremental increases or decreases in American influence in this or any area would be difficult to measure. U.S. influence probably depends on a myriad of factors, one of which is the credibility of a threat to use military force.⁸⁶ This credibility, in turn, must be based upon success on the battlefield. Mere threats may deter for a while, but at some point a capability

⁸⁴ This would include efforts to establish "protected enclaves" and "corridors." Sizeable questions arise in that case regarding that ability to find defensible terrain (to avoid repeating the situation that the U.S. Marines faced at the international airport in Beirut -- a low area partially ringed by hills with no mandate to secure the higher ground).

⁸⁵ The Clinton administration has repeatedly indicated that it will not use ground forces to intervene in Bosnia. New York Times, 6 May 1993. However, The Economist (24 April 1993), p. 51, anticipates that as many as 100,000 troops may be needed to enforce a peace, including 40,000 American, 15,000 British, and 15,000 French soldiers.

⁸⁶ One may also argue that there is an absolute limit to any nation's power to influence the events or conduct of others. America may have to face the fact that her influence, politically and militarily, may be limited in the Balkans.

must be demonstrated. As a logical corollary, though, a lack of success on the battlefield would probably diminish the credibility of a military threat and reduce the U.S.'s ability to influence events.

The success or failure of the intervention of ground forces cannot be predicted. If success is defined as a resolution of those factors which gave rise to the conflict (which may be hard to identify), success may never be possible. The deep and long hatreds bred by history and nurtured by the atrocities of the last year are not going to be assuaged even by complete conquest and long-term occupation of Bosnia, much less a limited deployment to "protected areas."⁸⁷

Ideological: The use of ground forces to promote democracy and prosperity in Bosnia presents other important questions. Bosnia is now divided into three spheres of control: Serb, Croat, and Bosnian (Muslim). Bosnian-Serbs now control two-thirds of pre-war Bosnia, they have proclaimed themselves a republic, and they have established a parliament. Bosnian-Croats control approximately twenty percent of Bosnia and have proclaimed their autonomy. The Bosnian government controls only the small remainder of territory. To use ground forces to re-establish the original government's influence over the extensive portions of the nation that it no longer controls would likely require the use of force.

Were even a small band determined to resist, there would be a risk of casualties. Moreover, given the terrain and its impact on military operations, it may be virtually impossible to subdue those who might defy authority (probably both Croats and Serbs). Recall that the Balkan peoples have a proud tradition of guerrilla resistance. And, even if force were successful in establishing military control over all of Bosnia, political control will not necessarily follow because military success will not resolve the deeper issues of intolerance of ethnic minorities.

⁸⁷ Notably, Tito's thirty-five years of ironfisted rule proved incapable of preventing the outbreak of ethnic violence. In fact, had resolution of Croatian war crimes been promoted instead of suppressed, it has been suggested that the present day conflict might not have been as violent. Cviic, p. 19.

Economically speaking, efforts to rebuild Bosnia could begin if military control were quickly established over Bosnia.⁸⁸ To date, few have been willing to reconstruct buildings or businesses for fear they will simply be destroyed in the next round of fighting.⁸⁹ Seemingly, only a long term commitment of force would be successful in establishing a confidence in any peace, especially one that was militarily imposed, sufficient to spark a rekindling of the economy.⁹⁰

Moral: Were ground forces successfully deployed in all or part of Bosnia, the present level of violence and suffering could probably be reduced for the short term. The benefits are less obvious if a guerrilla resistance continues. Furthermore, belligerents could wait out the occupation and resume hostilities on departure of the intervening force, even if this occupation were long term. Moreover, if only part of Bosnia is occupied, such as for a "protected enclave," the intervenors must be willing to accept morally that the suffering and atrocities are likely to continue in those areas outside of their control.⁹¹

Partial occupation, therefore, presents the same moral dilemma that taking no action does -- watching others suffer, with inaction arguably condoning the violence. Seeking to avoid this dilemma and having forces on the ground may propel political leaders toward ordering the expansion of protected enclaves to help those nearby (which would probably require combat).

⁸⁸ Of course, the possibility of a determined insurgency makes foreseeable the continued destruction of the remaining infrastructure in Bosnia which can only delay any future economic recovery. One is reminded of the ironic words captured in Vietnam, "We had to destroy the village to save it."

⁸⁹ New York Times, 23 April 1993.

⁹⁰ One ironic note needs to be made: As a democracy intending to ensure its own continued long-term prosperity, the United States may be unable to commit a large number of forces to any conflict for a long period of time, particularly when the U.S.'s national security is not directly threatened. Unfortunately, it is probably only a large force committed for a long time that will be able to promote democracy and rebuild the economy in Bosnia.

⁹¹ One could hope that the presence of international forces might morally persuade the fighters to reduce their operational levels. Unfortunately, the presence of 23,100 UNPROFOR troops in the former Yugoslavian republics have so far had no such effect on the belligerents in Bosnia.

Thus, intervention for the moral purpose of reducing violence and suffering does not seem to allow for the placement of geographical limits on the deployment of ground forces.

The next of the nine questions is whether the introduction of ground troops through all or part of Bosnia will deter Serbia or Bosnian-Serbs from further military aggression. How others will react to a use of force is difficult to predict. One may speculate that Serbs will hesitate to resist aggressively foreign ground forces for fear of inviting full scale invasion and occupation.⁹² Even so, having a tradition of waiting out the occupation, what prevents a return to violence on departure of the troops? Once again the answer seems to be that a long term occupation would be needed to deter further violence.

To the question-- "will the use of ground forces deter other nations from aggressive or immoral acts?" -- a complicated response must follow. First, successful deterrence cannot be proven since, by definition, the unwanted act never occurred. Second, all deterrence theories assume, to some degree, that national leaders act rationally, another difficult proposition to establish in an age of Khomeinis and Khadafys. Third, an argument can be made that while the world's attention is distracted by the deployment of international ground forces to a region, opportunities are created for others to act.⁹³ Fourth, to be a deterrent, intervention must be effective and it has already been shown that the use of ground forces presents risks of failure which should not be ignored. Fifth, there may be those occasions in a nation's affairs where its leaders rationally conclude that aggressive action is in its best interest, notwithstanding the

⁹² One cannot totally discount the possibility that Serbs in Serbia and Bosnia will resist. Serbs have taken on an embattled rhetoric in many reports, denouncing the international attempts to contain the violence. As already described, given the terrain and military tradition, such resistance could produce casualties and perhaps never be truly subdued.

⁹³ Here one is reminded of Syria's consolidation of power in Lebanon while the world's attention was focused on the war against Iraq.

international reaction.⁹⁴ In sum, whether the involvement of ground forces will deter other nations from acting aggressively simply cannot be proven.⁹⁵

Before ground forces are committed to Bosnia, the question of whether their deployment is intended to reverse Serbian or Croatian gains must be answered. If deployment is limited to protective corridors and enclaves, then this operation supports the status quo. Implicitly then, Serbian and Croatian territorial gains would receive the imprimatur of the international community and some will claim that aggression was "rewarded" for failure to reverse it.

The only way to satisfy the axiom, "Aggression should not be rewarded," is to restore Bosnia to the status quo ante. To the extent that this can be done militarily, it would require the "roll back" of Serbian forces in the two-thirds of Bosnia they control and the same for the Croat-dominated areas. If even token resistance is offered, a substantial commitment of forces would be necessary to fulfill this objective.

Whether a partial or large scale deployment is contemplated, consideration has to be given to the duration of the commitment of forces. As noted, it is probably only a long-term commitment that will prevent opponents from overrunning these areas once intervening forces leave.⁹⁶

Turning to the issue of whether the deployment of ground troops would "punish" either Serbia or Serbian forces in Bosnia (or Croats, for that matter), it must be noted that partial deployment preserves the status quo and, therefore, does not punish anyone. A more aggressive deployment aimed at rolling back Serb or Croat control might incidentally exact some retribution

⁹⁴ The concept of deterrence is irrelevant in such instances. Recall that U.S. action in Grenada and Panama met with international criticism. Query whether the U.S. would have been deterred from those operations by the threat of an international military response.

⁹⁵ It is possible that the presence of international ground forces may restrain Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria from taking aggressive action in the Balkans.

⁹⁶ Certainly, other measures might be taken which could shorten the commitment, such as the training and arming of those within the protected areas (although this would not be not an overnight task). Training and equipping defense forces could then be coupled with a gradual reduction of international forces although a token presence would always be maintained as a deterrent.

(i.e. do more than simply reverse the gain), particularly if attacks were made directly on Serbia or Croatia.

Will the use of ground forces aid the resolution of "war crimes?" Partial deployment is unlikely to meet this aim, since again it preserves present positions. Neither Serbia nor Croatia are likely to assist in resolving war crimes by surrendering their nationals to any foreign or international tribunal. Likewise, it is unlikely that any Serbian or Croatian courts are going to act against their own citizens merely by virtue of the fact that international forces have been deployed.⁹⁷

A broader deployment may assist in settling war crimes if those captured in the process are turned over to an appropriate international tribunal, if one were established. Complete military victory over these nations may be the only way to gain control over those most directly responsible for war crimes.⁹⁸

In summary, the introduction of ground troops seems to address no direct security threat to the United States. Additionally, it cannot be proven one way or another whether the use of ground forces will deter aggressive acts by other nations outside of the Balkans. The deployment of ground forces may promote U.S. influence in the area, if successful, and it may reduce violence and suffering to some degree in the short term. However, unless sizeable forces are introduced for a long time with broad military objectives, it is unlikely that their introduction will promote democracy or prosperity, deter or punish (much less reverse) Serbian aggression, or resolve war crimes.

⁹⁷ The 23,100 international troops on the ground now have not sped the resolution of these issues, nor have they seemed to reduce the number of attacks on civilians by Serbs, Croats, or Muslims. New York Times, 22-23 April 1993.

⁹⁸ Note that despite the highly publicized "war crimes" Iraqis allegedly committed in the occupation of Kuwait (as well as against Kurds and Shiites), this Gulf War objective has largely been abandoned.

The Use of Air Power in the Balkans⁹⁹

Many analysts outside and inside the present administration have proposed using air power in the Bosnian conflict. Advocates have proposed using air strikes to "take out" Serbian artillery, interdict supply routes from Serbia to Bosnia, and strike military infrastructure in Serbia.¹⁰⁰ These proposals will be tested against the nine questions.

National Security: The use of air power in Bosnia or Serbia will not significantly improve the national security of the United States. In fact, the loss of crews and aircraft in combat operations may diminish national security given the time and expense required to train and equip air forces, particularly in an era of greater fiscal austerity.

Influence: Few can decry the psychological impact of jet aircraft screaming overhead or of coming face to face with an Apache or Cobra gunship. The presence of such forces has a substantial influence on all who encounter them. They also demonstrate a willingness to remain

⁹⁹ The points made in this section could also be made for limited raids in Serbia or Bosnia conducted by special operations forces. It should also be noted that using air power in the fashion suggested does not mean there will not be U.S. forces on the ground seeking intelligence, directing air strikes, or undertaking search and rescue missions.

¹⁰⁰ Some general comments about the use of heliborne or airborne weapons should be made.

First, air power is most effective when directed against troop concentrations, fighting equipment, and military infrastructure. Those fighting in Bosnia have been largely irregular forces, with the occasional support of armored vehicles and artillery (mortars are used frequently). Large troop concentrations appear unlikely. Moreover, troops frequently blend with civilians and wear a mix of uniforms, making identification of friend or foe extremely difficult. There is little military infrastructure in Bosnia. Serbia is more industrialized and would offer more lucrative targets for aircraft and cruise missiles. Supply lines from Serbia to Bosnia must cross several bridges and those would be lucrative interdiction targets.

Second, as has been mentioned, Bosnia is entirely mountainous. The mountains are forested and abound with caves and caverns. Consequently, innumerable covered and concealed positions exist for military equipment such as artillery, tanks, or trucks. Mortars have reportedly been mounted on all types of civilian and military vehicles. Their high mobility coupled with the terrain will make them hard to find. Once found, they will be difficult to identify as friend or foe.

Third, the forested mountainous terrain offers numerous covered and concealed positions for surface to air missiles, which are reported in notable numbers in Bosnia. Therefore, anyone could be carrying a weapon lethal to aircraft.

The differing points of view on these issues, even among senior military officers, was reported in the New York Times, 29 April 1993.

engaged in the area. Unfortunately, this influence can be diminished by unintended civilian casualties¹⁰¹ and by the loss or capture of the crews and aircraft.

Ideological: The use of air power will not directly support the development of democracy or prosperity in Bosnia. In fact, the economic damage done from the air may prolong the economic crisis in that area. Other than preserve the status quo, if successful, its use presents no solutions to political problems, such as treatment of minorities, which retard the evolution toward a more liberal democracy.

Moral: Will the use of air power reduce violence and suffering? Air power, it is argued, will compel the Serbs (and Croats) to stop the process of ethnic cleansing.¹⁰² Air strikes are also proposed as a means to halt the indiscriminate shelling of civilians. Further, air power is thought to be able to protect such besieged Muslim enclaves as Srebrenica from further Serbian assault both by "taking out" Serbian artillery, thus "counter-balancing" the Serbs' greater firepower and by directly striking Serbian assault forces. If these propositions are correct, which will be discussed, then in the short-run the use of air power might reduce suffering and violence.

Air power has limits, though. As stated before, air power does nothing to resolve the underlying sources of the violence. Until those issues are resolved, the cessation of air protection would likely see the resumption of hostilities.

Nor is the use of air power likely to stop ethnic cleansing since this terror is often inflicted by small groups (that blend into the local population after the crime) going from house to house in the middle of the night.¹⁰³ These tactics are enormously difficult to counter from the air because of the challenges of detecting, identifying, and targeting these groups.

¹⁰¹ Given the terrain and the fact that the belligerents wear a mix of uniforms, if any, and readily intermingle with civilians, there will be great difficulty identifying friend from foe. This heightens the difficulty of avoiding civilian casualties.

¹⁰² An example of the arguments for an against use of airpower can be in the New York Times, 29 April 1993.

¹⁰³ New York Times, 23 April 1993.

Air power might make it harder for enemy artillery units to indiscriminately shell civilian areas, thus reducing casualties.¹⁰⁴ However, it cannot guarantee a stop to such actions given the ease with which these weapons can be moved and hidden. Moreover, air power will provide no protection from the frequent and indiscriminate sniper attacks on civilians.

Air power may be successful in partially interdicting Belgrade's supply of war material to Bosnian-Serbs, especially since most overland supply routes must cross bridges over the Drina River.¹⁰⁵ However, an estimated 250,000 tons of ammunition is already on the ground in Bosnia, enough to support combat at current levels for as long as two years.¹⁰⁶ Even when that runs out, there is no guarantee that the combatants will not continue the struggle using knives, clubs, or rifle butts.

Air power might also be able to protect the besieged areas if the Serbs (or Croats) attack with concentrations of troops and use supporting arms. If the Serbs and Croats can be deterred from attacking, then an opportunity to negotiate a settlement has been created. Notwithstanding that, however, air power alone is unlikely to break the sieges (or feed the hungry) in these areas.

The successful use of air forces may provide some "counter-balance" to the Muslims' lack of firepower by limiting the Serb's use of artillery. Unfortunately, however, air power will not redress Muslims' other strategic weaknesses, such as shortages of weapons and ammunition. Thus, even without their artillery support, the better-armed Serbs may be able to squeeze out besieged the Muslims through attrition and starvation.

To conclude on this question, although it is possible that air power may reduce suffering and violence, it seems more likely that it will have little effect.

¹⁰⁴ Air power might deprive gunners of stationary positions and prevent them from massing their fires. Being on the move more and being forced to camouflage positions would probably reduce the time they would have to fire on civilian areas.

¹⁰⁵ Vega, JIR 10/92, p. 448. Even if the bridges were knocked out, supplies may come across the river by barge or boat.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

The next question is "Will air power deter Serbia or Bosnian-Serbs (or Croats) from committing aggressive acts?" The answer to this question cannot be known in advance. It is possible that in the face of such an international display of force, the Serbs will back down. However, the use of air power may have the opposite effect. Note how the German bombing of British cities hardened English determination to resist the Nazis in 1940. Published accounts have indicated that despite overwhelming odds, Serbs are willing to fight on as their ancestors did against the Ottoman Turks.¹⁰⁷

Similar uncertainty prevails in trying to answer the next question: "Will the use of air power in Bosnia, Serbia, or Croatia deter other nations from aggressive acts?" Note that allied intervention on behalf of the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq did not prevent the outbreak of ethnic violence in the Balkans (or tribal violence in Somalia, or nationalist violence in Russia). Perhaps the nature of internecine violence is so absent of reason that concepts of deterrence are meaningless.¹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, this point cannot be verified.

The next question is, "Will the use of air power reverse Serbian or Croat gains in Bosnia?" Here, the likely answer is no. Air power, as proposed so far, is largely a means to preserve the status quo. It is unlikely that air power alone will be able to compel Serbians to give up control of the more than two-thirds of Bosnia that they now occupy (or the Croats their portion).

Air strikes may, particularly if directed at Serbia, exact some retribution for perceived wrongdoing. Those who have suffered at Serbian hands may take small satisfaction in those attacks. However, these feelings may be fleeting unless steps are also taken to return property and prosecute those who have committed war crimes. Air power alone will not be able to right

¹⁰⁷ New York Times, 23 April 1993.

¹⁰⁸ There have been many studies of the sources of revolutionary violence. The most recent is Jack Gladstone, et al, eds., Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). See also T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Louis R. Gottschalk, "Causes of Revolution," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1944).

those wrongs, which answers in advance the last question, "Will air power assist in resolving war crimes?"

In summary, air strikes against Serbia or Bosnian-Serbs may exert some influence in the region, reduce somewhat the violence and suffering, and exact some measure of retribution. It seems unlikely, however, that air power will promote the U.S.'s national security, foster democracy or prosperity, reverse unjust gains, or resolve war crimes. It cannot be proven that the use of air forces will deter Serbs or others from aggressive acts.

No-Fly Zone

The United Nations Security Council imposed a no-fly zone which prohibits the belligerents' use of military aircraft in Bosnia and has authorized the use of force to implement it. At present, U.S. forces are patrolling the area, along with NATO allies.¹⁰⁹

National Security: The no-fly zone does not directly enhance the security of the United States. Arguably the diversion of resources from training and other missions could adversely impact U.S. Security. Loss of aircraft and crews from these missions might negatively impact national security as well.

Realpolitik: The commitment of American air forces demonstrates U.S. commitment in the area which preserves some measure of influence (particularly over other U.S. allies that might want to become directly involved in the conflict). It represents at least an initial attempt to forge an international military response to events upon which other allied military action can be built. However, enforcement of a no-fly zone shows little promise in shaping the course of events in Bosnia.

¹⁰⁹ Although air forces have played some role in this conflict, Serbian forces have predominately relied on ground forces for their successes. This fact presents a major difference with the no-fly zones in Iraq, where because of the remoteness of the regions involved, Iraqi forces relied extensively on air power to strike the Kurds and Shiites. Thus, the no-fly zones in Iraq presented a means by which much of the suffering could be stopped.

As a second general comment, I would note that because the no-fly zone has been implemented, analysis of this strategy is enhanced by the success (or not) it has had to date.

Ideology: The use of American air assets to enforce a no-fly zone does not directly enhance the prospect of democracy or prosperity in Bosnia since it only preserves the status quo. It offers no resolution of the political difficulties which, if unsettled, will continue to fuel the conflict. Therefore, the carnage can continue, with or without the belligerents using their limited air assets.

Moral: Will the no-fly zone reduce violence and suffering? To the limited extent that violence and suffering were attributable to air attack, yes, this option will reduce it (assuming it is effectively executed). However, the level of overall violence in Bosnia has been largely unaffected by the no-fly zone to date (admittedly enforcement provisions have only recently been added). Ethnic cleansing, done in small groups at night, will continue, as will the indiscriminate targeting of civilians by artillery or snipers. Except for the use of air support, the no-fly zone has not brought a marked reduction in Serbian or Croatian combat efforts.

Will the no-fly zone deter other nations from taking aggressive action? Interestingly, the imposition of no-fly zones to protect the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq did not deter Serbia's aggression. However, a nation which relies on its air assets to attack its neighbors (or its own citizens) might be deterred if it thought that its very expensive aircraft might be lost in the process. In contrast, those nations that primarily use ground forces to inflict aggression may be undeterred when they observe the lack of impact the no-fly zone has had on Serbs' or Croats' abilities to accomplish their military and political objectives. To them, the threat of a no-fly zone will likely ring hollow (as it apparently has in Bosnia).

The answer to the last three questions is negative. Being only a means to preserve the status quo, the no-fly zone will not reverse the unjust gains, punish aggressors, or resolve "war crimes" issues.

To summarize, the no-fly zone does not directly enhance U.S. security, promote democracy and prosperity, reduce violence and suffering, reverse unjust gains, punish aggressors, or settle war crimes. However, with relatively minimal risk, this option does maintain U.S. involvement in the area and could supply the groundwork from which some further allied action might be built.

Conclusion

The discussion above explored the propriety of the use of military force in Bosnia via nine analytical questions. The answers to those questions demonstrated that none of the proposed strategies satisfies the four general categories of goals: security, Realpolitik, ideological, or moral. Moreover, the discussion revealed that the strategies meet only some of the goals, often at the expense of others. It is necessary, therefore, to prioritize among the goals.¹¹⁰ Outside of resolving direct threats to national security, which would seem to take precedence, I submit that ranking the other goals is itself an important policy determination.

The discussion also exposed the fact that some goals may not be attainable without a prolonged and sizeable commitment of force. Consequently, since Clausewitz warns that military objectives must be feasible given the level of military means available,¹¹¹ the broad goals discussed above will need to be pared down to something more realistically obtainable.

These issues await resolution. Their settlement is all the more imperative since the Bosnian crisis is likely to be repeated, complete with calls for U.S. military intervention, elsewhere in the Balkans (Kosovo and Macedonia, for example), in the former Soviet republics, in the horn of Africa, and in many other regions.

¹¹⁰ How one defines success then becomes an issue. Is it when we satisfy just one, two, or three goals, even if we cannot achieve them all?

¹¹¹ On War, pp. 585, 606.

